VS willen in Irak mogelijk bases houden


Washington/ Bagdad, 15 maart. De Verenigde Staten willen mogelijk een permanente militaire aanwezigheid in Irak houden om de gematigden in de regio te versterken tegen extremisten en de oliestroom te beschermen.


Dat heeft generaal John Abizaid, de hoogste Amerikaanse commandant in het Midden-Oosten en Centraal-Azië (Centcom), gisteren gezegd in het Huis van Afgevaardigden. Abizaid zei dat dit zal moeten worden uitgewerkt met de komende Iraakse regering. Eind vorige maand verklaarde brigade-generaal Mark Kimmitt op een persbriefing van het State Department nog dat het „ons beleid op dit punt” was dat „we geen permanente basis in Irak houden”. Kimmitt is adjunctdirecteur strategie en planning van Centcom.

Over de huidige Amerikaanse sterkte zei Abizaid gisteren dat als in Irak een regering van nationale eenheid wordt gevormd „er naar mijn mening elke reden is te geloven [...] dat we tegen december 2006 de omvang van de macht aanzienlijk verder kunnen verminderen”. Minister van Defensie Rumsfeld liet gisteren doorschemeren dat het aantal Amerikaanse militairen in Irak, nu 133.000, de komende dagen mogelijk enigszins zal toenemen in verband met de massale toestroom van pelgrims naar heilige steden ter gelegenheid van religieuze feestdagen.

Overigens zit de vorming van een regering van nationale eenheid in Irak nog muurvast.

Generaal Abizaid noemde de noodzaak om tegen het terreurnetwerk Al-Qaeda te vechten en „de ambities van een expansionistisch Iran in toom te houden” als redenen om een presentie in de regio te houden.

Hij wees tegelijk op de grote belangen die de VS en hun bondgenoten in de olierijke regio hebben. „Uiteindelijk komt het neer op het vrije verkeer van goederen en hulpbronnen waarvan de welvaart van onze natie en alle anderen in de wereld afhangt”, zei hij. (Reuters, AP)



NRC, 15 maart 2006

__________________
"Never argue with an idiot, they'll just bring you
down to their level and beat you with experience." (c)TB

Irak ziet de burgeroorlog al


Iraakse en Amerikaanse bewindslieden spraken het afgelopen weekeinde in koor tegen dat in Irak al een burgeroorlog woedt. De oud-premier van het land, Ijad Allawi, die vorig jaar zijn functie neerlegde, had dat gezegd tegen de BBC. „Wij verliezen elke dag vijftig tot zestig mensen door het hele land, als het er niet meer zijn. Als dit geen burgeroorlog is, dan weet God alleen wat een burgeroorlog wel is”, aldus de oud-premier.


Het geweld in Irak is sterk toegenomen na de vernietiging in februari van een belangrijk sjiitisch heiligdom in de stad Samarra door een aanslag. Sindsdien worden er vrijwel dagelijks stoffelijke overschotten gevonden van groepjes geëxecuteerde mensen.

De Amerikaanse minister van defensie Donald Rumsfeld schreef gisteren in de Washington Post dat de terroristen proberen een burgeroorlog uit te lokken, maar dat het buiten kijf staat dat ze terrein aan het verliezen zijn. Hij wees erop dat religieuze leiders die aanvankelijk positief over de opstandelingen waren, inmiddels afstand hebben genomen van de Iraakse tak van Al Qaida.

Verder schrijft Rumsfeld dat Iraakse militairen in toenemende mate onafhankelijk van de Amerikanen opereren. „Iraakse veiligheidstroepen zijn bij ongeveer 75 procent van alle militaire operaties in het land betrokken.” Hij voegde eraan toe dat bijna de helft van die acties zelfstandig is uitgevoerd door de Irakezen. Rumsfeld voelt er niets voor de Amerikaanse militairen nu al uit Irak te halen, omdat terroristen dan naar zijn mening vrij spel krijgen. Voor hem zou een terugtocht te vergelijken zijn met het na de Tweede Wereldoorlog teruggeven van Duitsland aan de nazi's.

Oud-premier Allawi heeft ondanks zijn sombere uitspraken wel hoop op een politieke overeenkomst tussen soennieten, sjiieten en Koerden. „Het land kruipt” volgens hem in de richting van een politieke overeenkomst. Maar een regering van nationale eenheid is nog geen oplossing voor alle problemen, aldus de gewezen bewindsman.


Trouw, 20-03-2006

__________________
"Never argue with an idiot, they'll just bring you
down to their level and beat you with experience." (c)TB

U.S. Companies Profited As Iraqi Children Died


At the beginning of the Iraq war, the UN entrusted $23bn of Iraqi money to the US-led coalition to redevelop the country. With the infrastructure of the country still in ruins, where has all that money gone? Callum Macrae and Ali Fadhil on one of the greatest financial scandals of all time.


03/20/06 "The Guardian" -- -- In a dilapidated maternity and paediatric hospital in Diwaniyah, 100 miles south of Baghdad, Zahara and Abbas, premature twins just two days old, lie desperately ill. The hospital has neither the equipment nor the drugs that could save their lives. On the other side of the world, in a federal courthouse in Virginia, US, two men - one a former CIA agent and Republican candidate for Congress, the other a former army ranger - are found guilty of fraudulently obtaining $3m (£1.7m) intended for the reconstruction of Iraq. These two events have no direct link, but they are none the less products of the same thing: a financial scandal that in terms of sheer scale must rank as one of the greatest in history.

At the start of the Iraq war, around $23bn-worth of Iraqi money was placed in the trusteeship of the US-led coalition by the UN. The money, known as the Development Fund for Iraq and consisting of the proceeds of oil sales, frozen Iraqi bank accounts and seized Iraqi assets, was to be used in a "transparent manner", specified the UN, for "purposes benefiting the people of Iraq".

For the past few months we have been working on a Guardian Films investigation into what happened to that money. What we discovered was that a great deal of it has been wasted, stolen or frittered away. For the coalition, it has been a catastrophe of its own making. For the Iraqi people, it has been a tragedy. But it is also a financial and political scandal that runs right to the heart of the nightmare that is engulfing Iraq today.

Diwaniyah is a sprawling and neglected city with just one small state paediatric and maternity hospital to serve its one million people. Years of war, corruption under Saddam and western sanctions have reduced the hospital to penury, so when last year the Americans promised total refurbishment, the staff were elated. But the renovation has been partial and the work often shoddy, and where it really matters - funding frontline health care - there appears to have been little change at all.

In the corridor, an anxious father who has been told his son may have meningitis is berating the staff. "I want a good hospital, not a terrible hospital that makes my child worse," he says. But then he calms down. "I'm not blaming you, we are the same class. I'm talking about important people. Those controlling all those millions and the oil. They didn't come here to save us from Saddam, they came here for the oil, and so now the oil is stolen and we got nothing from it." Beside him another parent, a woman, agrees: "If the people who run the country are stealing the money, what can we do?" For these ordinary Iraqis, it is clear that the country's wealth is being managed in much the same way as it ever was. How did it all go so wrong?

When the coalition troops arrived in Iraq, they were received with remarkable goodwill by significant sections of the population. The coalition had control up to a point and, perhaps more importantly, it had the money to consolidate that goodwill by rebuilding Iraq, or at least make a significant start. Best of all for the US and its allies, the money came from the Iraqis themselves.

Because the Iraqi banking system was in tatters, the funds were placed in an account with the Federal Reserve in New York. From there, most of the money was flown in cash to Baghdad. Over the first 14 months of the occupation, 363 tonnes of new $100 bills were shipped in - $12bn, in cash. And that is where it all began to go wrong.

"Iraq was awash in cash - in dollar bills. Piles and piles of money," says Frank Willis, a former senior official with the governing Coalition Provisional Authority. "We played football with some of the bricks of $100 bills before delivery. It was a wild-west crazy atmosphere, the likes of which none of us had ever experienced."

The environment created by the coalition positively encouraged corruption. "American law was suspended, Iraqi law was suspended, and Iraq basically became a free fraud zone," says Alan Grayson, a Florida-based attorney who represents whistleblowers now trying to expose the corruption. "In a free fire zone you can shoot at anybody you want. In a free fraud zone you can steal anything you like. And that was what they did."

A good example was the the Iraqi currency exchange programme (Ice). An early priority was to devote enormous resources to replacing every single Iraqi dinar showing Saddam's face with new ones that didn't. The contract to help distribute the new currency was won by Custer Battles, a small American security company set up by Scott Custer and former Republican Congressional candidate Mike Battles. Under the terms of the contract, they would invoice the coalition for their costs and charge 25% on top as profit. But Custer Battles also set up fake companies to produce inflated invoices, which were then passed on to the Americans. They might have got away with it, had they not left a copy of an internal spreadsheet behind after a meeting with coalition officials.

The spreadsheet showed the company's actual costs in one column and their invoiced costs in another; it revealed, in one instance, that it had charged $176,000 to build a helipad that actually cost $96,000. In fact, there was no end to Custer Battles' ingenuity. For example, when the firm found abandoned Iraqi Airways fork-lifts sitting in Baghdad airport, it resprayed them and rented them to the coalition for thousands of dollars. In total, in return for $3m of actual expenditure, Custer Battles invoiced for $10m. Perhaps more remarkable is that the US government, once it knew about the scam, took no legal action to recover the money. It has been left to private individuals to pursue the case, the first stage of which concluded two weeks ago when Custer Battles was ordered to pay more than $10m in damages and penalties.

But this is just one story among many. From one US controlled vault in a former Saddam palace, $750,000 was stolen. In another, a safe was left open. In one case, two American agents left Iraq without accounting for nearly $1.5m.

Perhaps most puzzling of all is what happened as the day approached for the handover of power (and the remaining funds) to the incoming Iraqi interim government. Instead of carefully conserving the Iraqi money for the new government, the Coalition Provisional Authority went on an extraordinary spending spree. Some $5bn was committed or spent in the last month alone, very little of it adequately accounted for.

One CPA official was given nearly $7m and told to spend it in seven days. "He told our auditors that he felt that there was more emphasis on the speed of spending the money than on the accountability for that money," says Ginger Cruz, the deputy inspector general for Iraqi reconstruction. Not all coalition officials were so honest. Last month Robert Stein Jr, employed as a CPA comptroller in south central Iraq, despite a previous conviction for fraud, pleaded guilty to conspiring to steal more than $2m and taking kickbacks in the form of cars, jewellery, cash and sexual favours. It seems certain he is only the tip of the iceberg. There are a further 50 criminal investigations under way.

Back in Diwaniyah it is a story about failure and incompetence, rather than fraud and corruption. Zahara and Abbas, born one and a half months premature, are suffering from respiratory distress syndrome and are desperately ill. The hospital has just 14 ancient incubators, held together by tape and wire.

Zahara is in a particularly bad way. She needs a ventilator and drugs to help her breathe, but the hospital has virtually nothing. Her father has gone into town to buy vitamin K on the black market, which he has been told his children will need. Zahara starts to deteriorate and in desperation the doctor holds a tube pumping unregulated oxygen against the child's nostrils. "This treatment is worse than primitive," he says. "It's not even medicine." Despite his efforts, the little girl dies; the next day her brother also dies. Yet with the right equipment and the right drugs, they could have survived.

How is it possible that after three years of occupation and billions of dollars of spending, hospitals are still short of basic supplies? Part of the cause is ideological tunnel-vision. For months before the war the US state department had been drawing up plans for the postwar reconstruction, but those plans were junked when the Pentagon took over.

To supervise the reconstruction of the Iraqi health service, the Pentagon appointed James Haveman, a former health administrator from Michigan. He was also a loyal Bush supporter, who had campaigned for Jeb Bush, and a committed evangelical Christian. But he had virtually no experience in international health work.

The coalition's health programme was by any standards a failure. Basic equipment and drugs should have been distributed within months - the coalition wouldn't even have had to pay for it. But they missed that chance, not just in health, but in every other area of life in Iraq. As disgruntled Iraqis will often point out, despite far greater devastation and crushing sanctions, Saddam did more to rebuild Iraq in six months after the first Gulf war than the coalition has managed in three years.

Kees Reitfield, a health professional with 20 years' experience in post-conflict health care from Kosovo to Somalia, was in Iraq from the very beginning of the war and looked on in astonishment at the US management in its aftermath. "Everybody in Iraq was ready for three months' chaos," he says. "They had water for three months, they had food for three months, they were ready to wait for three months. I said, we've got until early August to show an improvement, some drugs in the health centres, some improvement of electricity in the grid, some fuel prices going down. Failure to deliver will mean civil unrest." He was right.

Of course, no one can say that if the Americans had got the reconstruction right it would have been enough. There were too many other mistakes as well, such as a policy of crude "deBa'athification" that saw Iraqi expertise marginalised, the creation of a sectarian government and the Americans attempting to foster friendship with Iraqis who themselves had no friends among other Iraqis.

Another experienced health worker, Mary Patterson - who was eventually asked to leave Iraq by James Haveman - characterises the Coalition's approach thus: "I believe it had a lot to do with showing that the US was in control," she says. "I believe that it had to do with rewarding people that were politically loyal. So rather than being a technical agenda, I believe it was largely a politically motivated reward-and-punishment kind of agenda."

Which sounds like the way Saddam used to run the country. "If you were to interview Iraqis today about what they see day to day," she says, "I think they will tell you that they don't see a lot of difference".


The Guardian, 20-03-2006

__________________
"Never argue with an idiot, they'll just bring you
down to their level and beat you with experience." (c)TB